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Commercial Paper, Bank Deposits and Collections: Adopt
Uniform Commercial Code Provisions Regarding Negotiable
Instruments and Bank Deposits and Collections
CODE SECTIONS:

BILL NUMBER:
ACT NUMBER
GEORGIA LAWS:
SUMMARY:

EFFECTIVE

DATE:

O.C.G.A §§ 9-3-24, 11-1-201, -207, 11-3-101 to
-605, 11-4-101 to -108 (amended), -109 to -111
(new), -201 to -214 (amended), -215 to -216
(new), -301 to -303, -401 to -407, -501 to -504
(amended), 24-4-23.1 (new)
HB 1388
1017
1996 Ga. Laws 1306
The Act amends the entirety of those provisions
of the Code regarding commercial paper, namely
negotiable instruments and bank deposits and
collections. The Act largely adopts Uniform
Commercial Code Articles 3 and 4. The purpose
of the Act is to keep regulations current with
technology and business practices and to
accommodate efficient payment processing. In
its revisions to Article 3, the Act clarifies the
requirements for "holder in due course" status,
expands the provisions governing the discharge
of an obligation, reconciles the law regarding
liability for signatures on instruments to
conform with general agency law, and provides
a comparative negligence standard for liability
for fraudulent indorsements. The Act also
revises the provisions regarding transfer and
presentment warranties, reconciles a split in
authority regarding conversion of instruments,
and clarifies the suretyship defenses. The Act
also makes several changes to Article 4 to
reflect the increasing automation of the banking
industry.
July 1,1996

History
In early 1991, the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform
State Laws and the American Law Institute, co-sponsors of the Uniform
Commercial Code (UCC), made substantial changes to Articles 3 and 4
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of the UCC and presented the revised UCC for the states'
consideration. l Since these revisions were presented to the individual
states in 1991, thirty-eight legislatures have passed the revised
Articles, generally,vith few variations. 2
Georgia's versions of Articles 3 and 4 had been in effect since the
1960s.3 The old Article 3,4 dealing with negotiable instruments, was a
revision of the Uniform Negotiable Instruments Law of 1896.5 As such,
both its language and its conceptual approach to commercial paper
were outmoded,6 particularly in light of technological advances and
changes in business practices since the nineteenth century.7
Additionally, there was an unresolved conflict in case authorityB over
(1) the definition of "ordinary care" in connection with a bank
transaction9 and (2) the effect of the UCC on the common law of accord
and satisfaction. 1o
Although Article 4 11 was revised more recently than Article 3, it is
nevertheless similarly outdated. 12 In particular, Magnetic Ink
Character Recognition (MICR), the process of encoding numbers on
checks for identification in an automated check processing system, was
not commonly used until after the passage of the original Article 4. 13
Georgia's Article 4 addressed only manual check processing and did not
address MICR automated check processing. 14 Further, the old Article 4
was inadequate to deal with the increasing practice of check truncation,
which eliminates the physical handling of paper checks at some point in

1. U.C.C. Subcommittee Report on Articles 3 and 4, 1996 Report, at 1 (1996)
[hereinafter Subcommittee Report] (available in Georgia State University College of
Law Library). This was a report on the UCC Subcommittee on Articles 3 and 4 of
the UCC Committee of the State Bar of Georgia. This report was submitted to the
State Bar Advisory Committee on Legislation.
2. Id.
3. Telephone Interview with Rep. Greg Kinnamon, House District No. 4 (June 1,
1996) [hereinafter Kinnamon Interview]; see 1962 Ga. Laws 156, § 1, at 236-308
(formerly found at O.C.G.A. §§ 11-3-101 to -805, 11-4-101 to -504 (1994».
4. 1962 Ga. Laws 156, § 1, at 236-82 (formerly found at O.C.G.A. §§ 11-3-101 to
-805 (1994».
5. Subcommittee Report, supra note 1.
6. Kinnamon Interview, supra note 3.
7. Subcommittee Report, supra note 1.
8. Id.
9. See infra notes 21-27 and accompanying text.
10. See infra notes 57-63 and accompanying text.
11. 1962 Ga. Laws 156, § 1, at 282-308 (formerly found at O.C.GA §§ 11-4-101 to
-504 (1994».
12. Kinnamon Interview, supra note 3.
13. Id.
14. Id.
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the check collection process, destroying the paper itself after retaining
certain information stored in the MICR co ding. 15

HB 1388
While there were two versions of HB 1388 drafted before it passed,
no substantive changes were made between the initial version and the
bill as passed. 16

Definitions
The Act amends Code sections 11-3-103(a)(4) and 11-4-104(c) to
provide a new definition of "good faith" as: "honesty in fact and the
observance of reasonable commercial standards of fair dealing.,,17 The
old Code defined good faith as "honesty in fact."IS This change is
significant in that it safeguards commercial parties by requiring those
who claim exemption from certain defenses as a "holder in due course"
to meet not only the subjective "honesty in fact" test, but also the more
objective test of adhering to reasonable commercial standards of fair
dealing. 19
The Act also defines "ordinary care,,,20 which the old Code had
specifically refrained from defining.21 Code section 11-3-103(a)(7)
defines "ordinary care" in business dealings as:
observance of reasonable commercial standards, prevailing in
the area in which the person is located, with respect to the
business in which the person is engaged. In the case of a
bank that takes an instrument for processing for collection or
payment by automated means, reasonable commercial
standards do not require the bank to examine the instrument
if the failure to examine does not violate the bank's
prescribed procedures and the bank's procedures do not vary
unreasonably from general banking usage not disapproved by
this article or Article 4 of this title.22
Thus, this definition augments the new definition of good faith by
more specifically delineating a financial institution's burden for

15. Kinnamon Interview, supra note 3.
16. Compare HE 1388, as introduced, 1996 Ga. Gen. Assem. with O.C.G.A. §§ 11-3101 to -605, 11-4-101 to -504 (Supp. 1996).
17. O.C.G.A. §§ 11-4-103(a)(4), -104(c) (Supp. 1996).
18. 1962 Ga. Laws 156, § 1, at 164 (formerly found at O.C.G.A. § 11-1-201 (1994».
19. Subcommittee Report, supra note 1, at 4.
20. O.C.G.A. § 11-3-103 (Supp. 1996).
21. 1962 Ga. Laws 156, § 1, at 283-84 (formerly found at O.C.G.A. § 11-4-103
(1994».
22. O.C.G.A. § 11-3-103(a)(7) (Supp. 1996).
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adhering to reasonable commercial standards.23 Thus, a bank. need not
examine each instrument presented for collection if the bank is
following procedures it developed in accordance with general banking
usage. 24 This new definition resolves a conflict in case law concerning
whether the existence of ordinary care in a particular transaction is a
question of law or fact.25 The Act mandates that the question of
whether a bank has exercised ordinary care in using procedures which
do not require it to review every single instrument depends on the
factual circumstances, specifically the general industry standards.26

Holder in Due Course Status
A "holder in due course" is a person or entity who acquires a note or
other negotiable instrument, subject to certain conditions, such that he
(the holder) is free from certain defenses on the underlying
transaction.27 The holder in due course status was presumably
conferred upon the holder of the note to facilitate the negotiability of
the note.28 Thus, a party (usually a large financial institution) could
buy a note from a local bank, which had in turn taken the note from a
customer in exchange for credit, without having to worry about any
possible defenses except the credit risk.29
One of the prerequisites for holder in due course status is that the
holder take the instrument "in good faith."30 Because the Act has
redefined good faith, a holder must observe reasonable commercial
standards in addition to meeting the "honesty in fact" requirement. 31
The Act also provides that holder in due course status will be
prevented by apparent evidence of forgery, alteration, irregularity, or
incompleteness.32 Even if the defense made by the obligor to attempt

23. Subcommittee Report, supra note 1, at 4.
24. Id.
25. Compare Medford Irrigation Dist. v. Western Bank, 676 P.2d 329 (Or. Ct. App.
1984) with Wilder Binding Co. v. Oak Park Trust & Say. Bank, 552 N.E.2d 783 (ill.
1990).
26. O.C.GoA § 11-3-103(a)(7) (Supp. 1996). Nevertheless, a party could contest those
standards as being "unreasonable, arbitrary, or unfair as used by the particular
bank." U.C.C. § 4-103 cmt. 4 (1995).
27. SPEIDEL ET AL., PAYMENT SYSTEMS 89 (1993); O.C.GoA § 11-3-305 (Supp. 1996).
28. SPEIDEL ET AL., supra note 27.
29. [d. Note, however, that the law has almost completely abolished the status of
holder in due course in connection with consumer transactions. [d.; 15 C.F.R. 433
(1996). Still, the doctrine continues to be important in commercial transactions.
SPEIDEL ET AL., supra note 27.
30. O.C.GoA § 11-3-302(a)(I) (Supp. 1996).
31. Subcommittee Report, supra note 1, at 4.
32. O.C.GoA § 11-3-302(a)(2)(ii) (Supp. 1996). The Act requires, as a precondition
for holder in due course status, that "the instrument when issued or negotiated to
the holder does not bear such apparent evidence of forgery or alteration or is not
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avoiding repayment of the obligation is unrelated to the above defects,
the holder may not utilize "holder in due course" status to defeat the
defense. 33 The former Article 3 did not make clear whether the claim
or defense had to be related to the irregular nature of the instrument in
order to prevent holder in due course status.34 The new section thus
provides extra protection for commercial parties by preventing a holder
from claiming lack of notice of the irregularity if such defect was
apparent.3S
The Act also specifies the rights of a holder who has not paid or
performed the full compensation for an instrument.36 Such a holder
has rights as a holder in due course in proportion to the consideration
paid or performed.37 Code section 11-3-302(d) states that, where
consideration has been partially performed, "the holder may assert
rights as a holder in due course of the instrument only to the fraction of
the amount payable under the instrument equal to the value of the
partial performance divided by the value of the promised
performance."38 Before the Act, it had been unclear as to whether a
holder who had made only partial performance had any rights at all as
a holder in due course.39
The Act further amends Article 3 by clarifying the rules concerning
notice of breach of fiduciary duty in transactions between fiduciaries. 40
Code section 11-3-307(a)(1) defines a fiduciary as "an agent, trustee,
partner, or corporate officer or director, or other representative owing a
fiduciary duty with respect to an instrument."41 The subject matter of
this section, which was not covered by the old Article 3,42 involves
situations in which:
an instrument is taken from a fiduciary for payment or
collection or for value, the taker has knowledge of the
fiduciary status of the fiduciary, and the represented person
makes a claim to the instrument or its proceeds on the basis

otherwise so irregular or incomplete as to call into question its authenticity." [d.
33. See id. § 11-3-302.
34. See 1962 Ga. Laws 156, § 1, at 252 (formerly found at O.C.G.A. § 11-3-302
(1994»).
35. Subcommittee Report, supra note 1, at 4-5.
36. O.C.G.A. § 11-3-302(d) (Supp. 1996).
37. [d.
38. [d.

39. Subcommittee Report, supra note 1, at 5.
40. O.C.G.A. § 11-3-307 (Supp. 1996).
41. [d. § 11-3-307(aXl).
42. See 1962 Ga. Laws 156, § 1, at 252 (formerly found at O.C.G.A. §§ 11-3-301 to
-307 (1994».
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that the transaction of the fiduciary is a breach of fiduciary
duty.43
In such situations, takers are not holders in due course.44 As such, a
taker would be liable to the beneficiary of an instrument if the fiduciary
misappropriates the proceeds of the instrument, so long as the taker
has notice of a possible breach of fiduciary duty.45 Under Code section
11-3-307(b)(l), notice of a possible breach of fiduciary duty constitutes
notice of the claim of the represented person. 45 Under Code section 113-307(b)(2), a taker has notice if the instrument is:
(i) taken in payment of or as security for a debt known by the
taker to be the personal debt of the fiduciary; (li) taken in a
transaction known by the taker to be for the personal benefit
of the fiduciary; or (iii) deposited to an account other than an
account of the ... represented person. 47
Code section 11-3-307 differs from the old Code in that the old Code
section (1) did not define fiduciary status, (2) did not specifically define
the situations in which fiduciary status applied, and (3) did not
consider the deposit of an instrument into an account of someone other
than the represented person as adequate notice.48

Effect of Instrument on Underlying Obligation
Prior to the Act, an obligation underlying an instrument was
discharged when the bank was a drawer, maker, or acceptor of the
instrument and when there was no recourse on the instrument against
the obligor;49 however, the language regarding discharge of obligation
effectively excluded situations in which the obligor indorsed cashier's
checks, certified checks, or teller's checks.50 Code section 11-3-310 now
specifically includes these instruments as instruments that will also
discharge an obligation if taken for the obligation.51 However, the Act
also mandates that such a discharge will not affect any liability that
the obligor might otherwise have as an indorser of the instrument. G2
The Act also resolves conflicting case law53 regarding the effect of
43. O.C.G.A. § 11-3-307(b) (Supp. 1996).
44. Subcommittee Report, supra note 1, at 5.
45. Id.
46. Id.
47. O.C.G.A. § 11-3-307(b)(2) (Supp. 1996).
48. See 1962 Ga. Laws 156, § 1, at 253 (formerly found at O.C.G.A. § 11-3·307
(1994».
49. [d. at 281 (formerly found at O.C.G.A. § 11-3-802 (1994».
50. Subcommittee Report, supra note 1, at 5.
51. O.C.G.A. § 11-3-310(a) (Supp. 1996).
52. [d.
53. Compare Rhone v. State Auto Mut. Ins. Co., 858 F.2d 1507 (11th Cir. 1988)
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Article 3 on the common law of accord and satisfaction.54 While most
courts have held that the old Code did not change the existing common
law of accord and satisfaction,55 the Act amends Code section 11-1-207
by codifying the common law rule that a person who receives a check
offered to payoff a pre-existing dispute in full waives the balance of the
claim by accepting and cashing the check.56 The previous Article 3
provided that a party who performed or promised performance in a
manner demanded by the other party did not prejudice any rights
which he had explicitly reserved by doing SO.57 The Act adds a
subsection to Article I which states that the existing provisions do not
apply to an accord and satisfaction.58 This change prevents a party
from cashing a check offered in accord and satisfaction of a previously
existing obligation and then seeking to collect the balance of the debt
that would have been owed had it not been for the accord and
satisfaction.59

Signatures
The Act amends the law regarding liability for instruments by
changing the prior rule that "no person is liable on an instrument
unless his signature appears thereon"50 to one which accounts for the
signatures of representatives. 61 Prior to the Act, courts had generally
interpreted the law regarding liability to mean that an undisclosed
principal was not liable on an instrument, 52 although this
interpretation directly conflicted with the law of agency, which binds an
undisclosed principal on a simple contract.53 The Act resolves this
conflict by providing in Code section 11-3-402(a) that:
If a person acting or purporting to act as a representative
signs an instrument by signing either the name of the
represented person or the name of the signer, the represented
person is bound by the signature to the same extent the
represented person would be bound if the signature were on a
simple contract. If the represented person is bound, the

with AFC Interiors v. DiCello, 544 N.E.2d 869 (Ohio 1989).
54. Subcommittee Report, supra note 1, at 5-6.
55. [d. at 5; see, e.g., Rhone, 858 F.2d at 1511.
56. D.C.GoA § 11-1-207(2) (Supp. 1996).
57. 1962 Ga. Laws 156, § 1, at 170 (formerly found at O.C.GoA § 11-1-207 (1994».
58. O.C.GoA 11-1-207(2) (Supp. 1996).
59. Subcommittee Report, supra note 1, at 6.
60. 1962 Ga. Laws 156, § 1, at 257 (formerly found at O.C.GoA § 11-3-401 (1994».
61. O.C.GoA § 11-3-402(a) (Supp. 1996).
62. Subcommittee Report, supra note 1, at 6.
63. See, e.g., United States v. Everett Monte Cristo Hotel, Inc., 524 F.2d 127 (9th
Cir. 1975).
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signature of the representative is the "authorized signatw'e of
the representative person" and the represented person is
liable on the instrwnent, whether or not identified in the
instrwnent.64 .
Thus, an undisclosed principal is liable on the instrument. 65
The Act further amends Article 3 to provide that a corporate agent is
not individually liable on a check drawn on a corporate account that he
signed without indicating his representative capacity and without
naming the principal.66 This amendment departs from the clear
language of the old Code, which had indicated that a person would be
liable for any instrwnents upon which his signature appeared. s7 So
long as the corporation is identified on the check, Code section 11-3402(c) provides that the corporate agent will not be personally liable.68
The Act further amends Code section 11-3-402 to provide that an agent
may use parol evidence to prove that his signature was made in a
representative capacity, except against a holder in due course.69

Fictitious Payees, Impostors, and Faithless Employees; Comparative
Negligence

In regard to transactions made by impostors, fictitious payees, and
faithless employees, the Act clarifies the responsibility of the drawer in
terms of loss allocation.70 The old Code made a distinction between
persons who impersonate payees of a check and persons who pretend to
be agents of the principal.71 In the former case, a person who forged
the check was able to pass good title,72 while in the latter case
impostors had no power to forge the name of the principal,73 and thus
such forgeries were ineffective and rendered the instrwnent nonnegotiable. 74 The Act does away with this distinction in Code section

64. O.C.G.A. § 11-3-402(a) (Supp. 1996).
65. Subcommittee Report, supra note 1, at 6.
66. O.C.G.A. § 11-3-402(c) (Supp. 1996).
67. 1962 Ga. Laws 156, § 1, at 257 (formerly found at O.C.G.A. § 11-3-403(2)
(1994».
68. O.C.G.A. § 11-3-402(c) (Supp. 1996).
69. Id. § 11-3-402(b)(2).
70. Id. §§ 11-3-404 to -405.
71. 1962 Ga. Laws 156, § 1, at 258 (formerly found at O.C.G.A. § 11-3-405 (1994».
This distinction between impostors who pass themselves off as agents of the payee
and those who purport to be agents of the principal is highlighted in Thornton & Co.
v. Gwinnett Bank & Trust Co., which held that the old Code section was not
applicable to one who represents himself as an agent of the principal and procures a
check payable to the order of the principal. 151 Ga. App. 641, 260 S.E.2d 765 (1979).
72. Subcommittee Report, supra note 1, at 7.
73. Id.
74. 1962 Ga. Laws 156, § 1, at 258-59 (formerly found at O.C.G.A. § 11-3-405

https://readingroom.law.gsu.edu/gsulr/vol13/iss1/20
HeinOnline

-- 13 Ga. St. U. L. Rev. 48 1996-1997

8

: COMMERCIAL CODE Commercial Paper, Bank Deposits and Collections:

1996]

LEGISLATIVE REVIEW

49

11-3-404, making instruments negotiable even when the check is made
out to an imposter's purported principal.75
Before the Act, many courts held that any indorsement that deviates
even slightly from the name of the payee on the face of the check
prevents a bank from asserting that the indorsement is effective under
Code section 11-3-404, thus causing the loss to fall on the bank.76 The
Act amends this section by adding new language defining what
constitutes an effective indorsement.77 Under Code section 11-3-404(c),
an indorsement is made in the name of the payee, and is thus effective,
if: "(1) it is made in a name substantially similar to that of the payee;
or (2) the instrument, whether or not indorsed, is deposited in a
depositary bank to an account in a name substantially similar to that of
the payee."78
Finally, the Act provides a comparative negligence standard for
allocating liability for acts of impostors or fictitious payees.79 Because
the former Article 3 did not require a bank to exercise reasonable care
in paying the forged instrument,SO some courts held the drawer liable
regardless of the degree of the bank's negligence.s1 However, Code
section 11-3-404(d) provides that:
[I]f a person paying the instrument or taking it for value or
for collection fails to exercise ordinary care in paying or
taking the instrument and that failure substantially
contributes to loss resulting from payment of the instrument,
the person bearing the loss may recover from the person
failing to exercise ordinary care to the extent the failure to
exercise ordinary care contributed to the 10ss.82
The Act also changes prior law by applying comparative negligence to
other matters.83 Thus, the Act amends Code section 11-3-405 by
providing that all parties, including banks, are liable to the extent of
their negligence.84

(1994».
75. O.C.GA § 11-3-404 (Supp. 1996).
76. Subcommittee Report, supra note 1, at 7.
77. O.C.GA § 11-3-404(c) (Supp. 1996).
78. [d.
79. [d. § 11-3-404(d).
80. See 1962 Ga. Laws 156, § 1, at 258-59 (formerly found at O.C.G.A. § 11-3-404
(1994».
81. Subcommittee Report, supra note 1, at 8.
82. O.C.GA § 11-3-404(d) (Supp. 1996).
83. See id. § 11-3-406(b) to (e).
84. Subcommittee Report, supra note 1, at 8.
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Transfer and Presentment Warranties
The old Code section 11-3-41785 covering warranties on presentment
and transfer has been separated into two sections under the Act-Code
section 11-3-416, which deals with' transfer warranties,ss and Code
section 11-3-417, which deals with presentment warranties.57 The Act
requires prompt notice of a breach of transfer or a presentment
warranty, or else the warrantor may be discharged to the extent of any
loss caused by the delay in giving notice. 58 The old Code contained no
provision for timely notice of a breach of these warranties.59
The Act also prevents the warrantor from disclaiming either a
transfer or presentment warranty in connection with a check.90 The
old Code did not specifically deal with the applicability of presentment
and transfer warranties to checks.91

Accommodating Modern Technology
Most of the changes made to Article 4 were made to accommodate
changes in modern technology and check processing practices since the
original Article 4 was drafted. 92 In particular, the advent of Magnetic
Ink Character Recognition (MICR) technology, which electronically
encodes numbers on checks so that they may be processed in an
automated system, has rendered archaic much of Article 4, which
contemplates only paper-based systems.93 One of the most significant
aspects of MICR technology is that it facilitates check truncation, a
process in which the checks are not returned to the customer; rather,
the information on the checks is supplied to the customer.94 The Act
specifically authorizes this practice in Code section 11-4-406, which
states that a bank has provided the customer with sufficient
information regarding the checks if it provides the "item number,
amount, and date of payment."95 This change was made to facilitate

85. 1962 Ga. Laws 156, § 1, at 263-64 (fonnerly found at O.C.GA § 11-3-417
(1994».
86. O.C.GA § 11-3-416 (Supp. 1996).
87. [d. § 11-3-417.
88. [d. §§ 11-3-416(c), -417(e).
89. See 1962 Ga. Laws 156, § 1, at 263-64 (fonnerly found at O.C.G.A. § 11-3-417
(1994».
90. O.C.GA § 11-3-417(e) (Supp. 1996).
91. See 1962 Ga. Laws 156, § 1, at 263-64 (fonnerly found at O.C.G.A. § 11-3-417
(1994».
92. Kinnamon Interview, supra note 3.
93. Interview with Mark Budnitz, Consumer Representative, U.C.C. Subcommittee
on Articles 3 and 4, in Atlanta (Apr. 23, 1996) [hereinafter Budnitz Interview].
94. Kinnamon Interview, supra note 3.
95. O.C.GA § 11-4-406(a) (Supp. 1996).
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truncation, which makes banking more efficient by handling less
paper.96
Interestingly, the Act retained a provision from the old law regarding
the time in which claims for the payment of unauthorized signatures
and indorsements must be made. 97 Under the UCC, a customer has up
to one year after the statements are made available to him to report an
unauthorized signature.9a The Act, however, retains a provision from
the prior Georgia law which requires that such reports be made within
sixty days of the alteration/9 although the customer still has up to a
year to report an unauthorized indorsement or other alteration to the
back of the instrument. 1OO The shorter period arose in response to a
concern that commercial customers might not promptly review their
statements, leaving the banks to suffer a 10SS.101 The problem,
however, is with smaller customers who do not look at their statements
within sixty days; Representative Kinnamon, sponsor of the Act, thinks
that the short time period may be deemed unconscionable by the courts
in the future. 102
The Act also amends Article 4 to include in the definition of
"separate office" of a bank "the location of any agent of a bank receiving
items for data processing purposes."103 The intent of this amendment
is to include new developments such as branches or facilities operating
in supermarkets and other locations not generally thought of as
"branches" in the definition of "separate offices."I04 Locations such as
these are deemed separate banks for determining the time and place in
which action must be taken or notice must be given. lOS This clause
was added to the UCC provision to insure that certain structures not
traditionally defined as "branches" are included in the notice
requirements. lo6

96. Budnitz Interview, supra note 93; Kinnamon Interview, supra note 3.
97. Compare 1963 Ga. Laws 156, § 1, at 305-06 (formerly found at O.C.G.A. § 114-406 (1994» with O.C.G.A. § 11-4-406(0 (Supp. 1996).
98. U.C.C. § 4-406(0 (1995).
99. O.C.G.A. § 11-4-406(0 (Supp. 1996).
100. [d. Note that the UCC revision requires customers to report forged customer
signatures and alterations only. U.C.C. § 406 (1995). The Georgia revision, however,
also requires the customer to discover forged indorsements. O.C.G.A. § 11-4-406(0
(Supp. 1996).
101. Budnitz Interview, supra note 93.
102. Kinnamon Interview, supra note 3. This is also problematic because it will be
difficult for customers whose checks are truncated to discover forged indorsements.
Budnitz Interview, supra note 93.
103. O.C.G.A. § 11-4-107 (Supp. 1996).
104. Kinnamon Interview, supra note 3.
105. O.C.G.A. § 11-4-107 (Supp. 1996).
106. Kinnamon Interview, supra note 3.
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Variations from the Uniform Commercial Code
The Act contains several other provisions held over from existing
Georgia law that do not mirror the UCC. One of these is an exception to
the statute of limitations requirements of Code section 11_3_118. 107
Subsection (h) of that section exempts "sealed instruments that are
governed by the provisions of Code section 9_3_23."108 Code section 9-323 provides a twenty-year statute of limitations for actions on such
instruments. 109 This holdover from the pre-Act code is unique among
the various state commercial provisions. 110
Similarly, the language at the end of Code section 11-3-503 dealing
with notice of dishonor was carried over from the previous Georgia
law. 111 The Act requires: "upon request of any party to the
instrument, the drawee shall provide a statement to the requesting
party giving the specific reason for dishonor, and the drawee shall have
no additional liability to the drawer as a result of such statement."112
The purpose of this non-UCC provision is to help ensure that, through
the requirement of a specific reason for dishonor by the drawee, there is
no arbitrary reason for the dishonor.1I3
Code section 11-3-602(c) is also a holdover provision from the
previous law. 114 This section requires an assignee to notify the maker
or drawer of an assigned note that the note was assigned and that
payment is to be made to the assignee. 115 Because the assignee must
provide notice that the note has been assigned, consumers are protected
by the requirement that they receive more information regarding the
entities to which they make payments. 116
Additionally, the assignee notification requirement is intended to
avoid a situation in which a customer who has not received notice
continues to pay the original holder, though the holder has kept the
money instead of transferring it to the assignee. ll7 In this situation,
the assignee would demand payment from the customer, who would

107. D.C. GoA § 11-3-118 (Supp. 1996).
108. Id. § 11-3-118(h).
109. 1855 Ga. Laws 233, § 11, at 234 (codified at D.C. GoA § 9·3-23 (1994».
110. Kinnamon Interview, supra note 3.
111. Compare D.C.G.A. § 11-3·503 (Supp. 1996) with 1962 Ga. Laws 156, § 1, at
272-73 (fonnerly found at D.C.GoA § 11-3-508 (1994».
112. D.C.GoA § 11-3-503(b) (Supp. 1996).
113. Budnitz Interview, supra note 93.
114. Compare D.C.GoA § 11-3-602(c) (Supp. 1996) with 1962 Ga. Laws 156, § 1, at
277 (fonnerly found at D.C.GoA § 11-3-603 (1994».
115. D.C.GoA § 11-3-602(c) (Supp. 1996).
116. Kinnamon Interview, supra note 3.
117. Budnitz Interview, supra note 93.
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have to pay twice. us Instead, the notice requirement ensures that the
customer pays only the party entitled to receive payment. 119
The Act also amends Georgia evidence rules to create "a presumption
that the check has been paid," in any dispute concerning payment by
check, when a copy of the check is produced along with the original
bank statement. 120 This is especially important when checks are
truncated and the original check no long exists.121

Benjamin D. Ellis

118.
119.
120.
121.

fd.
fd.
O.C.G.A. § 24-4-23.1(b) (Supp. 1996).
Budnitz Interview, supra note 93.
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